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Struggles and Possibilities: 
The Use of Tests in Decision 
Making 
Ellis Batten Page 
Duke University 
What a happy occasion it is to celebrate, as we do in this volume , the establish-
ment of a national Buros Institute of Mental Measurements, located on the 
campus of the University of Nebraska, in Lincoln . What a culmination of many 
plans, hopes, and dreams! On such an occasion, we can take a quiet pride in our 
profession and in the life and accomplishments of one of our colleagues and 
friends, Oscar Krisen Buros, who with Luella Buros is leaving to us, and our 
posterity , an institution of integrity to foster the science and practice of testing. 
How new all this field really is: According to Stanley and Hopkins (1972, p. 
163), the first large-scale testing was done in the City of New York Survey, in 
1911 . Oscar Buros was 6 years old then , so we can think of most of the 
astonishing developments in measurement really happening during his lifetime. 
And the first machine for scoring of answer sheets, the old IBM 805, was 
developed when Oscar was 30. Many of us can remember, only 20 years ago, 
many clerical workers reading the dials from these machines and writing the 
scores as they might be estimated from this analog device. Then these tools also 
became obsolete as the field was overtaken by optical readers and computer 
scoring. So Oscar and Luella Buros have witnessed the explosion of testing into a 
central institution of education, of psychology, of all the social and behavioral 
sciences. But they have done much more than witness: Their publications have 
served as a steady center of this growth, and their independence has established a 
tradition of reputation and honor as a goal, if not always as a realization , of the 
profession and the practice of testing . 
The establishment of such published symposia from the Buros Institute is an 
important further step. There is a major place for such a forum. I hope these 
symposia will represent a determined effort to stand apart from the testing giants, 
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just as Buros did, and to remain independent of federal agencies as well. The 
Institute, and these symposia , should continue to sponsor solid , sometimes se-
vere criticism of tests and test practices, also as Buros did. They should similarly 
stand apart from the political huckstering and trend riding, the cheap shots 
against testing, and apart from the constant distortion of what tests tell us about 
ourselves and our world. 
Of course, the Institute should make full modern use of wordprocess ing, 
automatic mailing, information retrieval, and all the present and future efficien-
cies of operation becoming available. But hopefully there will remain these 
steady principles that marked Buros' work, and a similar vision of mental mea-
surement , of how it can help our society to be happier and more productive. 
At such a historic time, it is a pleasure to remember the classic words of E. L. 
Thorndike (1918 , p. 16) , which serve as a kind of cornerstone for our whole 
professional and scientific development: 
Whatever ex ists at all ex ists in some amount. To know it thoroughly involves 
knowing its quantity as well as its quality. Education is concerned with changes in 
human beings; a change is a difference between two conditions; each of these 
condit ions is known to us only by the products produced by it- things made, words 
spoken, acts performed, and the like. To measure any of these products means to 
define its amount in some way so that competent persons will know how large it is, 
better than they would without measurement. To measure a product well means so 
to define its amount that competent persons will know how large it is with some 
precision , and this knowledge will be conveniently recorded and used. 
If we have, for our profess ion, an Apostle's Creed, surely Thorndike has here 
given it to us. And the last phrase echoes for us: "so that this knowledge will be 
conveniently recorded and used." And used. Aye, there's the rub and the thrust 
of the testing movement. It is the use of testing that has caused its growth from 
academic curiosity to a billion-dollar industry and that makes it a battle ground 
today for conflictiong ideologies and the warring of powerful political alliances. 
In my opinion, technical people in testing cannot go on sidestepping these major 
battles. Sooner or later, we should recognize publicly what it is that we believe; 
we should state our beliefs openly for both colleagues and society; and we should 
counterattack the falsehoods about testing. 
Who are these enemies? For one example, let us mention the recent storm of 
anti testing sentiment surrounding the publication of Gould's (198 1) book , The 
Mismeasure of Man. This book follows in the tradition of Leon Kamin's (1973) 
The Science and Politics of I. Q., the writing of the consumerists Nader and Nairn 
and of Lewontin , Layzer, and others. Once again, the major media have rushed 
to approve the new book by Gould and to endorse its claims. A recent New 
Yorker has an extended piece by one of their science popularizers, in which most 
test experts are implicitly denigrated and the founders of our disc ipline are 
derided and smeared . There are many echoes of these sentiments. 
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The major media of the Northeastern Seaboard are, of course, considerably 
more antitesting than is the American mainstream. What of the more conserva-
tive press? Although it is part of the conservative tradition to recognize and to 
accommodate large individual di fferences , the better-known conservative writers 
seem daunted by the name-calling and by the technical difficulty of the argu-
ments. Both sides are handicapped by the recondite nature of many of the core 
proofs of testing. As Garrett Hardin recently commented during a visit at Duke, 
most opin ion leaders and shapers who control our media, of whatever leaning, 
are highly literate but are " innumerate." Left or ri ght, journalists fail to grasp 
our technicalities . They believe that our hard-won principles (the best body of 
theory in the social sc iences) are purely a matter of opinion! 
Then what about the " numerate" scienti sts concerned with tests? Those who 
do speak out often suffer for it and are frustrated again and again by the major 
media. Consider, the experiences of one of our most productive and di stinguished 
defenders of psychometri cs, Arthur R . Jensen of Berkeley. Those who know him 
well can recount some of hi s harassment and defamation, which, by the way, is 
still going on. And Richard Herrnstein (1982) of Harvard has written a critique, 
much of it from his own unhappy treatment , about his efforts to be expressed 
properly in the major media. His forum is the Atlantic Monthly, an intellectual 
magazine that is highly respected and of general readership but that commands 
none of the publicity clout of CBS or of the New York Times and their multi-
million audiences . Some of Herrnstein ' s ( 1982) accusation is worth reproducing 
here: 
Incurably addicted to quantification, I have now searched the daily and the Sunday 
New York Tim es from 1975 to November 198 1 for all book reviews dealing with the 
IQ. The results speak for themselves. Of the 15 reviews that I found, everyone' 
denigrated IQ tests , often vitriolicall y. All but two of the books reviewed were ant i-
testing, as far as one can te ll fro m the reviews, and were praised for their position . 
One exception was a book by Arthur Jensen lI 980] , which happened also to be the 
only book by a trained psychometrician (psychometrics is the psychological spe-
cialty concerned with testing). Jensen 's book was panned by a philosopher with no 
detectable expert ise in the subject. 
Except for Jensen's book, none of the other major works on testing written by 
profess ionals during the period was reviewed. Most remarkabl y, however, the 
Times published no review by a trained profess ional. Dozens of literate psycho-
metricians might have commented on the shallowness of the books the Times 
usuall y chooses to re~"iew . But psychometrics is forbidden territory in the Times-
its books are mostly unreviewed , its discoveries are unreported, and its experts are , 
from what gets published , unconsulted. Rarely, if ever, in more than a decade , has 
a spec ialist published a review of a book on testing in the Times, [or in] other 
national publications that occasionally comment on testing. For no other subject of 
public concern- not for economic policy, disarmament, welfare reform, nuclear 
power plants- has the professional outlook on a controversy been so shut off fro m 
a voice in the national press. Yet , while public policy on testing may not have the 
immediacy of a tax cut or a nuclear accident , it ul timately affects everyone lp . 69] . 
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A DOUBLE STANDARD 
Herrnstein's (1982) article is a good one, revealing for all concerned with testing 
and education. Its principal burden is the double standard of treatment of two 
cases of apparent malfeasance by testing researchers: One of these cases is 
known widely even to college students; the other is a nonevent, conveniently 
buried from public awareness . The first, so widely known, concerns the probable 
falsification of certain twin data by the late, brilliant Sir Cyri l Burt. Herrnstein 
counted at least six stories about this apparent misconduct in the New York Times 
alone. However, as repeatedly noted by scholars of behavior genetics, nothing in 
Burt's estimates was very deviant from what has been found by other researchers 
since his reports. Burt's data are, in short, now redundant, and if he did fabricate 
some of his numbers, he "apparently knew enough to guess correctly" (Herrn-
stein, 1982, p. 70). But the attacks on him persist, endlessly, and are made 
central to denigrating not only behavior genetics but our entire field of mental 
measurement. 
The other story will probably be new to many readers and will surely be new 
to most nonspecialists. In J ul y 1981, Dr. Rick Heber, Director of the Waisman 
Center of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and chief adviser to a U.S. 
president on mental retardation, was convicted in federal court of diverting funds 
to personal use and was sentenced to 3 years in prison. Heber, it will be remem-
bered, was principal investigator of the much publicized miracle of the environ-
mentalist movement, the "Milwaukee Project." He had proved, he wrote, that it 
was possible to take 20 children of retarded parents and depressed homes and to 
raise their true IQs an average of over 30 points, from dull normal to superior in 
intelligence, by a massive preschool intervention. 
What of his results themselves and their claim to scientific seriousness? Eight 
years before that trial , an article was published for fellow researchers (Page, 
1972b), arguing that the Milwaukee Project was, for a number of technical 
reasons, not scientifically credible. And just before Heber's indictment, another 
article (Page & Grandon, 1981) carried an intensive criticism of the Project. In 
brief, we found that the Project, which had never been truly refereed , was 
extremely shaky, and the 'explanations of it shifted in ways quite unacceptable in 
scientific reporting . What evidence was avai lable on follow-up data, moreover , 
suggested that there was no residual difference between the treatment and control I 
groups on measures , such as school reading tests, which were outside the reach 
of Project management. The 30 points gain, if it ever existed, had apparently 
disappeared. 
The point here, however, is not to resurrect the Milwaukee Miracle to slay it 
again but to draw attention to the way that psychometric questions are treated in 
the media. The earlier "findings" of the Milwaukee Project had been widely 
noted in the national media. The Washington Post believed that it might have 
"settled once and for all" (sic) the question of heredity versus environment for 
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the intelligence of slum children. The New York Times had reported that the 
Project "has proved" that IQs could be raised more than 30 points by the 
methods of Heber and his associates (these quotes cited by Herrnstein , 1982). 
Wouldn't one suppose, therefore, that the disgrace of the Project leadership 
deserved some attention? After all, the Milwaukee work had been unique and 
widely acclaimed in its demonstration of such large environmental effects. And 
this demonstration had depended on faith in its leadership. Wouldn't the as-
tonishing misconduct of the leadership , then , cast some shadow across such 
findings, which no one else had obtained? 
Not at all. Not a word about the Heber scandal has appeared in the Times, the 
newsweeklies , Science magazine, or on national TV. To quote Herrnstein (1982) 
again, 
The media seem unwilling to publish anything that might challenge the certitude 
with which editors, politicians, judges, and others insist that we know how to 
increase measurable intelligence, or that test data "prove," to use The New York 
Times's word , that a poor environment causes familial retardation [po 7 10) . 
What is the cause of this remarkable double standard? Clearly , it is the ideology 
of the major media, warmly supportive even of falsehoods favorable to environ-
mentali sm, generally condemnatory of individual differences and hence of psy-
chometrics, our field , which persistently and embarrassingly reiterates important 
and substantial differences in humankind . 
Yes, we have our critics, and they have an extraordinary double standard; and 
they are in very strong positions, affecting the beliefs of everyone: of editors, 
educators, judges, legislators, federal officers, and the other countless millions 
who read the national press or listen to the national TV. If we believe in our 
di scipline and its contributions to society , then we had better stand up for our-
selves and our field. What, then, do we believe? 
THE VALUE OF TESTING 
Scientific Value. In our own quiet way, and in .our own private literature, 
there is a strong consensus among us concerning the pers isting values of our 
science and our profession. In an excellent summary of this question , the scien-
tific basis of testing was powerfully defended by Carroll and Horn (1981) . They 
showed our growth to be following the earlier development of physics, in our 
gathering understanding of intelligence and our strengthening theory. 
Poor Alternatives to Testing . Many of our negative reactions to our critics 
and would-be reformers are similarly shared among ourselves . That the inter-
ference of the courts is often ignorant , confused, and damaging is noted by even 
the mildest of sc ientific commenters (Bersoff, 1981) . And the reforms forced on 
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testing by outside criticism have, we are largely agreed, been frequently " non-
solutions" (Reschly , 1981). Such " unproductive changes" include the banning 
of intelligence tests (such as in California) and the use of " pluralistic norms" 
(such as SOMPA; cf. Mercer, 1977) . Often aggressive counterattacks to our 
critics are slipped quietly into our thoughtful articles written for each other. Such 
a counterattack is well illustrated by the comment of two of our respected 
colleagues (Carroll & Horn , 198 1): " Indeed , it seems clear to the present authors 
that far from being abused by overuse, the science of human abilities is underex-
ploited in diagnosis, counseling, and evaluation [p o 10 19] ." 
Fairness to Minorities. For a very important topic, the claim of racial un-
fairness , the view of experts was well summarized by Cole (1 98 1) , when she 
wrote - that " we have learned that there is not large-scale, consistent bias against 
minority groups in the technical validity sense in the major, widely used and 
widely studied tests [p o 1075]." This position has been strongly supported by a 
blue-ribbon panel on testing of the National Academy of Sciences . And a similar 
conclusion is widely understood for the question of bias in college admissions 
(Linn , 1982). Indeed, much of the claimed evidence against test validity , for 
example in employment , has apparently been misunderstood and improperly 
summarized (especially see Schmidt & Hunter , 198 1). 
IDEOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC ISSUES 
Through many arguments about test practice, however, run deeper currents of 
contemporary ideology, philosophical , political, and economic . Those who 
claim an exclusively societal or economic determinism are especially resentful of 
testing and psychometric research, and what these disciplines show us about the 
sources of human abilities and personality. In a candid account of the contempo-
rary scene, then, we must not avoid the issue of what science and scientists say 
about family influences on these traits, both genetic and environmental. 
Heritability of Intelligence 
Surely we can now say that there is a scientific consensus for the heritability of 
intelligence, and we can reject the name-calling of those who would say that 
hereditary influence is a delusion or a hoax. If there is any scholar who honestly 
questions it , and sincerely seeks evidence, there is a direct solution: Such a 
person should read--or even just browse- in Fuller and Thompson 's (1 978) 
weighty volume, Foundations of Behavior Genetics . Absorb the stately march 
there from fundamental genetic principles to physiology, to neurobiology, to 
quantitative methods, to the genetics of cognitive and intellectual abilities, to 
personality and temperament , to mental illness. Loiter, for a while, in the 40 
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pages of bibliography with their 1500 references. And for those with quantitative 
curiosity , there are excellent works available (Falconer , 1960; Thompson & 
Thoday, (979) . 
Or, if a scholar seeks further knowledge of the genetic evidence specific to 
mental measurements, give such a scholar Jensen's (1980) monumental book 
Bias in Mental Testing. Someday this may be more widely recognized as one of 
the best works ever written on testing, for the serious student of psychometrics . 
(For other informed appraisals of such evidences, see Bereiter, 1970; Cancro , 
1971 ; Hebert , 1977. And for a nontechnical treatment of the issues, see Jensen, 
198 1.) But then, how should we convince the lay world outside of the large 
consensus on this matter of heritability? In 1972, more than 50 scholars from 
fields bearing on this question published a " Resolution on Scienti fic Freedom 
and Heredity ," signing the emphatic statement that " we believe such influences 
are very strong. " (Page, 1972c). Of the 50 signers, 60% were in Who' s Who in 
America, and four were Nobel laureates. And their statement was published in 
the most prominent professional journal in psychology. But that testament , too , 
became a nonevent for the major media to ignore . The national press took no 
notice of this, nor did CBS when its special, " The IQ Myth ," led by Dan 
Rather, managed, through dist0l1ion and omission, to make test scores seem a 
pure artifact of favored environments. One of the most common responses of 
in formed psychologists and measurement experts is to avoid these questions or , 
if pressed , to state that these questions are not important for our major concern : 
the use of tests in decision making. On the contrary, I hope to persuade that such 
evas ions, of such overpoweringly central questions, must lead to waste, futility , 
and di shonor in our testing fi eld . Indeed, to some extent this has already 
happened . 
Nonetheless , it is curious how blind the media are to this consensus among 
scientists about the heritability of intelligence . Even Gould 's (198 1) book , with 
its strong ideological loading, does not exactly dispute the existence of heri-
tability , though taking exception to nearly every estimate of it. The device used 
by Gould , and by others before him , is to challenge the precision of such an 
estimate, as if some softness of numbers invalidated the whole pursuit. If a test 
score is not precise, they seem to affirm , it is useless. If a heritability estimate is 
not certain , then it is meaningless. One can only imagine the stultifying influence 
such perfectionism would have had on the growth of any of our sc iences? But the 
clear fact , revealed even in the most polemical criti cism to the careful reader, is 
that there is consensus about the large heritability of general intelligence . 
Heritability of Specia l Abilities 
Even among able psychometricians, however, there is much uncertainty about 
the heritability of specific abilities or achievement measures . To explore this 
question, a friend and I (Page & J arjoura, 1979) obtained an unprecedented data 
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set from one of the two major college testing programs, the respected American 
College Testing Program (ACT). Our results are briefly outlined here, as bearing 
on this important and neglected problem affecting many of the tests the schools 
have so widely adopted. If these measures, too, are loaded with heritability, we 
should take this fact carefully into consideration. 
As is well known , the ACT has four achievement tests , in the four fields of 
English, Math, Social Studies, and Natural Sciences. From two different years of 
testing, 1976 and 1978, ACT gathered for us 6800 pairs of twins from the nearly 
2 million students who used this excellent program to apply to colleges in those 
years . These twins were identified from the concordance of surname, birth date , 
and place of residence (or home phone) . Even without knowing which pairs are 
fraternal or identical, it is possible to do some genetic analysis of such a wonder-
fully large data base, as long as we are willing to make certain assumptions about 
same-sexed and opposite-sexed pairs (Scarr-Salapatek, 1971). Here there is little 
space for technical detail, but let us consider certain findings, displayed in Table 
2.1. 
Table 2.1 shows results from a factor analysis of the genetic components 
estimated from our methods (Page & Jarjoura, 1979 , p. 11 5). First, we observe 
the sizable loadings of the four tests on the principal genetic factor. The 
heritability estimates of these four tests were all high , by the way , ranging 
from .64 to .84 . That is , each of the four ACT achievement measures showed a 
substantial heritability in itself. The further question we raised, however, was the 
extent to which the measures were genetically unique and the extent to which 
they shared their genetic loadings with the others. 
In Table 2.1, Part A shows these loadings of the four measures on the first , 
unrotated principal factor from the genetic correlations we generated . In Part B 
of the table, we observe the amount of each of the genetic correlations , which is 
explained by the principal component. And in Part C we see that there is also a 
genetic loading specific to each of the four tests (these loadings are in the major 
diagonal). What is thought provoking, and not often recognized among psycho-
metricians, is that so much of the intercorrelation among such ability and 
achievement measures should have a unitary factor as its biological source. And 
it appears that G (genetic loading) and g (the always observed correlation among 
diverse mental measures) do indeed have much to do with each other. (See also 
kinship studies in Behrman, Hrubec , Taubman, & Wales, 1980; Loehlin, 
Lindzey, & Spuhler, 1975; Loehlin & Nichols , 1976; Martin, 1975.) 
From this example, we can score some points against frequent criticisms . One 
of the repeated claims is that Burt's apparent defection destroyed the basis for 
any belief in heritability. But obviously, Burt's few disputed twin pairs played no 
role in this large analysis (nor in numerous other analyses in the United States or 
abroad) . Another strawman from our critics is that we regard intelligence as a 
"single thing." This claim is clearly false. Here one sees that, even genetically , 
there are other influences distinct to each trait. Even so, however, here as in all 
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Trait 
Engli sh 
Math 
Soc. St. 
Nat. Sci. 
Engli sh 
Math 
Soc. St. 
Nat. Sci. 
TABLE 2.1 
Principal Factor Analysi s of the Genetic Components of Twin Data" 
English Math Soc. St. 
(A) Loadings on principal genet ic factor 
.7 1 .65 .83 
(B) Component "explained" by principa l factor 
.~ .% .~ 
. 14 
.43 
(C) Residual component 
.02 
.2 1 
.54 
.69 
- .02 
.00 
. 15 
"From Page & Jarjoura, 1979, p. 11 5. 
Nat. Sci. 
.84 
.59 
.55 
.70 
.7 1 
.00 
- .02 
.01 
.01 
"Of the total geneti c matri x, 8 1.5% of the variance was explained by the single factor. 
matrices of mental measures we see the ubiquitous positive component underly-
ing the whole matrix , which in this analysis is genetic. "S ingle thing" it is not; 
indeed , by all estimates, it is based on many gene loci. And psychologically 
there are surely various subabilities that contribute to it. Still , whatever its 
nature, g does appear , to a greater or lesser extent , in virtually all mental tests. 
Still another charge hurled at testers, but denied by our analysis, is that we 
believe that "genetics is all ." Our Table 2. 1 clearly rejects any such conclusion , 
as does the research of everyone else known to us. Indeed, it is the power of 
behavior genetics that it can best expose those influences that are, indeed , en-
vironmental. For example, we may consider the simple declaration that variance 
of a test is the sum of the genetic variance, the environmental vari ance, and error: 
Var(test) = Var(G) + Var(E) + error. (I) 
Then it is possible to regard a test score in the way suggested by Fig. 2. 1. 
For students of testing, thi s figure seems a most fa miliar one. From any test , 
we might in fer that the shaded curve represents the vari ance expectable from 
error around some true score X'. But let us alter the meaning: Let X' now 
represent the genotype, and the shaded figure represent the vari ation expected in 
the phenotype, through the operation of a combination of environment and errors 
of measurement. What such a perspective makes us realize is that , in each one of 
our mental test scores, we are indeed looking at a genotype, plus other influ-
ences. That is, we may consider the individual score to consist of genotype 
" true" score, the envi ronmental variations around such a genotype, and of 
course a res idual error variance . Indeed, given the enormous amount of research 
on these matters, we may assert that , for the individual student , most of the 
20 PAGE 
FIG . 2. 1 . Famili ar figure in measurement , applied to either re li ability or 
heritab ility. X may represent the " true score of a test" and the shaded curve 
represent measurement error. Or it may represent the genotype of a tes t for an 
individual and the shaded portion may represent the combination of environmental 
influences and measurement error. 
di stance from the mean is difference in genotype , and thi s is true, whether or not 
it conforms with the sentiments of CBS or of the New York Times. But this 
assertion in no way denies our pursuit of these environmental causes of test 
performance. Rather , it clarifies our goal and gives us some methods for identi-
fying the environmental variance without the usual distortion and confounding 
with an unconsidered background genetic variation. 
The formula in Equation (I) is of course very general. A more detailed 
formu la would be the following: 
Var(IQ) = Var(E) + Var(G) + Cov(G, E) + Var(G X E) + error , 
(2) 
where the two new terms represent the covariance and interaction of the genetic 
and environmental influences . These are surely plausible enough additions to 
such studies. It is logical that , given the sorting out of soc ial classes, in part 
caused by differences in ability of the parents, there cou ld be a correlation of 
genes and environment. And it is also logical that , to some extent , what favors 
one genotype might not favor another to the same degree. 
But such components are difficult to di stinguish in twin data and , therefore, 
are usually neglected in studies of heritability because of mathematical con-
founding. Yet critics have sometimes used thi s confounding to disparage any 
attempts at heritability analysis. One of the critics is an astronomer, who con-
temptuously referred to the usual methods of human genetics as " numerology," 
but then himself committed two astonishing logical errors in his mathematical 
proof (Layzer, 1974). Each of his objections to heritability leads to reductio ad 
absurdum . His policy argument is that all heritability analysis should be curtailed 
and that we as a society should emphasize only environmental efforts. His prime 
example of such remed iation was the Milwaukee Project (this was, of course, 
before those investigations were closed and the leaders sent to Federal prison) . 
There were the following two dilemmas : First , GE covariance either ex ists or it 
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does not. If it does not ex ist , then heritability analysis may proceed without it . If 
it does ex ist , then Layzer is already granting the argument of Herrnstein (1973) 
and of others that the upper soc ial classes are already partially sorted for genetic 
ability in intelligence. Either way, Layzer's practical conclusions are spoiled. 
His argument about G x E interaction suffers the same fate. If such interaction 
does not ex ist , then heritability studies may proceed without it. If it does exist , 
then, by the very definition of interaction , any marginal improvement in social 
environment will be, to the extent of that interaction , as unfavorable as it is 
favorable. (For a more complete treatment of thi s question, see Page, 1975; and 
for general treatment of interaction effects in the context of intelligence, see 
Eaves, Last , Maltin , & Jinks, 1977 .) 
Again , why are such matters worth speaking about , in a volume devoted to 
tests and decision making? Is it not enough that most able testers acknowledge 
the truth of heritability and of innate individual differences? Isn ' t thi s fact , 
indeed , something of an embarrassment to testing? Shouldn ' t we continue, by 
our pass ive, noncommittal reaction to these controversies, to paper it over? Isn' t 
it , in fact , almost bad manners to raise the question? So it has often been treated , 
and there is usually , as Herrnstein (1 973) points out , a personal and professional 
cost in res isting the tide of opinion as shaped by the major media. 
But these questions are important exactly because our fa ilure to resist such 
untruths is damaging the reputation of testing and seriously undermining its 
utility in making decisions. The truth or falsity of our assumptions is crucial to 
making long-range decisions, by the very nature of scientific dec ision making. 
To support this assertion , we turn to the nature of decision making and to the 
kinds of information requi red to make an intelligent choice. 
DECISION MAKING 
We should recognize that a sc ience of dec ision making has become itself a vast 
and well -developed field of applied mathematics and stati stics with many 
branches: linear programming, dynamic programming, transportation al-
gorithms, queueing theory, and many other techniques with large implications 
for behavior science . For a survey of the general fi eld , the reader may see many 
general texts in operations research (Churchman, Ackoff, & Arnoff, 1957; Hill-
ier & Lieberman, 1974; Trueman, 1974; Wagner, 1969) and increasingly in 
statistics (Hamburg, 1970; Winkler & Hays, 1975). Some of these methods have 
been studied for psychology or education (Anderson, 1970; Banghart , 1969; 
Johnstone, 1974; Kaufman, 1972; Levin , 1975; McNamara, 197 1; Novick & 
Jackson , 1974; Page, 1976 , 1978; Page & Canfield , 1975; Page, Jarjoura, & 
Konopka, 1976 ; Tillett , 1975; VanDusseldorp , Richardson, & Foley, 1971) . A 
few have brought such methods to bear directly on the use of tests (Cronbach & 
GIeser, 1965; Edwards, Guttentag, & Snapper, 1975; Page, 1980) . In general, 
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however, there has been little recognition of its importance to educational psy-
chology and its kindred disciplines, and few investigators have applied it to our 
most serious problems of educational choice. 
Decision Analysis. For easy understanding, the science of decision making 
is often expressed in the notation of decision analysis. and the notation is that of 
an upside-down tree, as shown in Fig. 2.2. The best-known writer in this field is 
undoubtedly Howard Raiffa (1968), whose approach can be appreciated without 
extensive mathematics, and can be applied directly in practical situations. 
In Fig. 2.2, let us suppose that there is a career choice at stake, such as 
whether to pursue a premedical career or some other. In this drastically sim-
plified representation, as in many more complex ones, there are just four aspects 
of choice: 
I. Decisions to be made (in squares). 
2. Probabilities to be estimated (in circles). 
3. Values of the outcomes (numbers at dots). 
4. Costs of the choices (small tollgates) . 
Let us assume that the values of the outcomes are estimated in the same units as 
the costs at the tollgate. Then such a tree may be automatically solved by 
applying recursively two rules, beginning at the bottom of the tree and working 
up: 
1. Probability nodes are averaged. by mUltiplying each value by its associ-
ated probability, summing across the branches, and carrying the weighted mean 
up to the node. 
2. Decision nodes are maximized. by selecting that branch that carries the 
highest net value. (Costs are subtracted from the value of the relevant branch.) 
Tests for Individual Decisions. Decision analysis, then, like most methods 
used in operations research, suggests our optimal choice, under the assumption 
of the correctness of our data. 
But where do we obtain the number themselves? They are based on some sort 
of data, either objective or subjective. And the role of tests in forecasting should 
be closely tied to the probabilities shown. The probabilities of various outcomes, 
once a decision is taken, must depend on all appropriate information about these 
outcomes: the experiences of others and the chooser's own abilities, past 
achievements, economic needs, and the like . For example, suppose that the 
choice of Plan B is for premedical training, where the payoff ($100 ,000 a year?) 
is high but where the general probability of success is only 1 in 5. In the 
individual case, this probability should be adjusted to the person concerned. 
Once again, test scores should play an important role in such adjustment , consid-
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FIG. 2.2 . A decision tree. A decision is reached by tracing out the branches as 
far as possible , assigning values to each terminal node, and probabilities to each 
branch from a P node. P nodes are then solved (working from the bottom up), by 
averaging out the branches. And D nodes are solved by fo lding back all but the 
most valuable branch as evaluated below each D. For vocations, the probability 
values are determined by knowledge of both the world and self, as are also the 
terminal values. Technical procedures can be appl ied to aid all such determina-
tions. (Source: Page, 1974b, p. 71. Reprinted with permission .) 
ered together with the background information about others who have gone 
before. 
Consider, then, what great damage is done to decision making, if tests are 
discredited and not used or if they are eliminated from the tools of decision 
makers by court order or administrative uncertainty . It is not only the testers who 
have much at stake in such mistaken elimination of tests; the biggest losers are 
the students and those who would guide and select them. 
From even such a simple model, an immediate realization is that such deci-
sion trees become complex, requiring computer assistance in their solution-just 
as life decisions are indeed complex, yet made quite haphazardly today, without 
mathematical help. We sti ll await truly competent, computerized advisory sys-
tems for such choices, though we have been aware of the need for some years 
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(Page, 1974b), and some working research models were established in the past 
(Katz, 1966). 
Tests for Program Decisions. Let us look at Fig. 2 .2 from another view-
point, as though we were administrators and the decision were between two 
programs, here labeled A and B. Suppose Program B seems to produce higher 
average values, where these are measured in terms of test scores, but our data are 
from a national study, where there is confounding of tests with school practices 
and with the SES variables of the communities. What we face , again, is that 
decision sciences must depend not on naive correlational data but on production 
functions of the treatment variables. If this seems an obvious point, then it has 
been seriously neglected in the social planning of the past several decades, and 
its neglect has led us to one disillusionment after another in the world of educa-
tional research and development (cf. Page, 1972a). 
Scores as Production Functions. In our desire to use tests in planning, we 
are often blocked when we must choose among educational programs. Choosing 
a criterion test then becomes troubled. Suppose one program relies more on a 
textbook and the other more on films. Then it will be very difficult to construct a 
test that will not be biased toward one outcome or the other. Quite understand-
ably, in such a situation, we often wisely choose tests that are not so close to the 
programs. We may, rather, choose a selection of standardized tests of global 
ability or achievement: in English, for example , or in math , social studies , or 
natural sciences . But wait, these are the very tests we found to be heavi ly loaded 
on the same g factor (general abi lity). Even more disturbingly, they are loaded on 
the same G factor (general genetic ability). And when we employ pre- post 
testing with such measures, the change scores have well-known problems. Are 
we really expected to detect the effects of programs through such measures of 
general (and even genetic) ability? 
Yes, in general we must, for there seem to be few defensible alternatives. We 
have mentioned the experimental bias of tests designed explicitly for the com-
parisons, and these (even where avai lable) have many problems beyond such 
built-in program biases. Tests that are called "criterion referenced" frequently 
exhibit these problems . We have long seen much literature for and against such 
criterion referencing, and some excellent consideration and debate have occurred 
(for example, by Julian Stanley, Robert Ebel, Roger Lennon, and Frank 
Womer) . For an extended period Dr. Womer directed the massive National 
Assessment of Educational Progress, which was dedicated, at least originally , to 
the criterion-referencing philosophy (also see Page, 1982 , on this philosophy). 
For research questions about programs, such issues have a special bite. 
Special Versus General Tests of Achievement. Let us briefly summarize our 
dilemma: On one hand, it is fairly easy to write tests that measure some very 
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limited body of knowledge (e.g. , the new vocabulary taught in a spec ific lesson) . 
Here indeed we can show marked change from before an instruction to after. On 
the other hand , a small handful of words will have practically no visible effect on 
one's ability to read general matter- and this is the goal we really cherish for 
major decisions. If we test only the explicit program content , we may be acting 
out something like the " drunkard' s search," which the philosopher Abraham 
Kaplan used to tell us about at UCLA . The drunkard was feeling around under a 
lamppost and was asked what he was looking for . " I dropped my key ." Where 
did you drop it? " Over there. " But if you dropped it over there, why are you 
looking for it over here, under the lamppost? " This is where the light is." 
We can , after all , develop a test for the lesson just past , which may show us 
how we improved . That is where the light is. But the most important outcomes of 
education often seem like the lost key, beyond our reach , over there in the dark. 
Is there a way out of this problem? Yes, if we have sufficient numbers and 
sufficient random ass ignment and accurate enough predictive control variables, 
then our standard errors of the means will be small enough to permit comparisons 
that are meaningful for such standard testing programs. Such conditions, howev-
er , hold in probably less than I % of the evaluation situations that face the 
psychometric researcher . 
Showing Environmental Effect. The problem is not hopeless . If we have, 
indeed , important variables, sufficient cases, and solid models, we may be able 
to show these important environmental influences in a helpful light. Let us 
consider two findings from recent research on the applied issue of private and 
public schooling. 
Our first case illustrates the danger of fa iling to provide for large individual 
differences (in g or in G) . Coleman , Hoffer , and Kilgore (1981) had claimed 
very prominently that , even after' ' controlling" for effects of family, they found 
a striking superiority of the private schools in the United States in the educational 
achievement of the huge sample from High School and Beyond . In a reanalysis 
of the data, however , this time including six brief subtests of mental ability 
(mostly nonverbal and relatively school-free) , we found that any residual effect 
of private school was less than 0 .5% of the variance in student achievement 
(Page, 198 1; Page & Keith , 198 1) . Thus a claimed environmental effec t largely 
disappeared when student input was weighed into the test. This is, of course , a 
common enough result when such variables are included- which has apparently 
led some to wish to avoid measuring intelligence in such research. 
The second findings, from the same debate, had a more optimistic outcome , 
as shown in Fig . 2 .3 . In Fig. 2 .3, we observe some major student vari ables, such 
as family background , race , and general ability , which are understandably load-
ed with parental influences , both genetic and environmental, and largely beyond 
the control of the school system. But here we al so introduced the amount of 
homework the student did , as a causal variable for the general achievement of 
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FIG . 2.3. Explaining student ach ievement of students in private and public high 
schools. After allowing for background variables, homework still explains 3% of 
test ach ievement. (Source: Page & Keith , 1981. Reprinted with permission.) 
reading and math. Clearly, from the paths shown , our major background vari-
ables were fundamental in explaining test achievement; and the special control of 
"general ability" (a factor score made from two short vocabulary tests and four 
nonverbal tests) was the most influential of all. Yet the homework does shine 
through, explaining 3% of the variance in achievement even after controlling for 
background variables. The eternal verities of educational psychology sti ll stand: 
After ability , time spent on task does make the most difference, and our standard 
tests, even loaded as they are with heritability, can show that such time matters. 
Indeed, in this case of school comparison, homework also helps explain about 
half of the tiny effect of private schools. 
Tim Keith and I believe that homework, then , is a major variable that all 
schools should emphasize, one that could truly improve performance. Keith's 
(1982) separate article shows this homework effect even more clearly for student 
grades: There is, in fact , a possible compensation for low ability shown in this 
study of grades, with the low-ability hard worker actually catching up with the 
high-ability nonworker in such school performance. Keith's remarkable graph is 
shown in Fig . 2.4. 
But another problem of practical decision making is illustrated in this home-
work question. I have talked about these results with various groups of policy 
people: school boards , legislators, practicing administrators, equal opportunity 
officials, teachers, and even governors active in education. The idea of increas-
ing homework seems to have no lobbies ! To the contrary, there is often an 
embarrassed si lence (and the facts are indeed embarrassing, with the average 
senior doing less than 4 hours of homework each week, in all classes combined). 
Some educators have even denigrated the homework question altogether, speak-
ing of "meaningless drill" and the like. Clearly, far more than our psychometric 
research enters into educational policy! But this case does illustrate how test 
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information may improve our knowledge of bas ic issues, and our understanding, 
if not always our application, of practical issues . 
Heritability and Program Research. Our general neglect of heritability has 
led to research handicaps that may unfortunately hinder our understanding of 
some policy issues . In order to guide curricular change, we should know which 
variables are relatively more influenced by fami ly variables and which more 
influenced by schools. But our usual research strategies, with no kinship con-
trols, do not often permit thi s distinction. Given large samples of twins and 
siblings, however, and item information across achievement tests, we could do 
heritability analysis on each item. Or, if zygosity were not known for the twin 
pairs, we could analyze which items were more influenced by home or school , 
and various analyses of these results could in turn illuminate areas for greater 
curricular attention in those schools showing such deficits. 
Still another application of such techniques could be in matters of national 
assessment, where we seek to track the national performance of student genera-
tions and to study the changes from one generation to another. For example, 
there remain large questions about the causes of the decline of standardized test 
scores over the past 15 years or so. One real possibility-that declines were 
caused by shifting ability levels of parents- was never really explored. Yet item 
analysis of the SAT scores, using the huge available samples of twins, might cast 
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some light on the question, through the following reasoning: Reused items may 
be measured at two points in time and their gain or loss reported. The twin 
correlations of such reused items may be also discovered. Then if the more 
family-influenced items are those in which there is greatest decline, the inference 
would be that the decline was more likely caused within the home than within the 
school; and the conclusions would be quite different from those in the contrary 
case. Conceivably, this exploration would not be very productive (we would 
soon find out), but it would open a major line of investigation. And it was a 
thesis that would be very easy and inexpensive to explore. A major cluster of 
hypotheses remained unstudied . Once again, our psychometric understandings 
are frustrated by our current political and ideological commitments. And we have 
failed to make adequate use of the psychometric information available to us in 
our search for improved social strategies. 
Decision Making and Ratio Scales. One apparent problem of test scores for 
decision making is the following: Most scientific strategies for optimizing deci-
sions require that benefits be measured on some absolute scale of values. In 
many decision techniques (such as certain kinds of dynamic programming), one 
develops a ratio of costs and benefits for each alternative choice , a ratio that 
makes no sense unless both costs and benefits have some recognized zero points. 
Even in simple decision trees like that in Fig. 2.2, where costs are used there 
must be some way of equating costs and benefits; they must be translated to the 
same scale. But in mental measurement, we take most of our test scores to be 
interval scaled, not ratio scaled. How may this difficulty be overcome, so that the 
most important outcomes of education may be appropriately studied? 
This question has been considered elsewhere, but some general answers may 
be suggested here. Any time we consider change in scores then we have , indeed, 
a ratio scale, for no change will be zero; two points will be twice the value of one 
point, etc. Now, as we know, change scores have their own problems, because 
the error variances are additive, whereas the subtraction of one score from the 
other eliminates from the result most of the variance in the true scores. But if we 
use group change scores, as we often will in program decisions, then indeed the 
errors of measurement are made very small as the number of observations grows 
large; and our analysis may proceed. 
Often, of course, we will not have repeated measures on the same group but 
will have some other groups that may be regarded as controls for comparison 
purposes in our multivariate studies. Here, again, a zero point may be established 
as the mean made by the relatively "untreated" control, and a production func-
tion may be estimated as a relation between possible alternatives and the growth 
in such means. This should not give the impression that all such questions of zero 
points are easily resolved but that they can become tractable for many practical 
purposes in scientific decision making. And we are currently taking little advan-
tage of such strategies. 
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TEST SCORES AND DEEPER VALUES 
Test scores, we have assumed, measure those outcomes for which we most 
depend on our schools. The scores, then , stand for social values that we highly 
esteem. Yet strangely little attention has been given to the placing of these test 
values in some higher framework . 
Suppose we ask the simplest curricular question: For example, should we 
double the time for mathematics in a certain grade, at the expense of some other 
course of study, such as history? How could we obtain evidence to help guide us 
in this decision? It is striking that, after 70 years of using test scores and a 
century of behavioral science, we still have no commonly accepted way of 
combining such test scores or of trading them off against each other. 
The Bentee. A decade ago, some of us studied this question , with the 
concern of being able to use test scores as production functions (Page, I 972d, 
1973, 1974a, 1976, 1980; Page & Breen, 1974a, 1974b). In this work , we felt it 
necessary to invent a unit of measurement of educational benefit, called the 
bentee, for benefit T-score. An illustration of the bentee is shown in Fig . 2.5. 
In this figure, we note that the bentee represents the highest educational value, 
and the branches beneath it stand for seven major branches of educational gain, 
ranging from the verbal, quantitative, social sciences, and natural sciences 
through esthetic learning, matters of the body (such as sports, health) to the 
"personality" (which may include citizenship and moral and spiritual learning 
where these are deemed appropriate). Each of these major branches may be itself 
divided into subdivisions. In the present figure, only one, verbal, has been 
divided into seven exhaustive areas. And one of these in turn, literature, has 
been divided. And the tree branches down through poetic analysis and poetic 
meter, to iambic pentameter, the great verse metric that has been the medium of 
Shakespeare and of many of our greatest English poets. Recognition of iambic 
pentameter, then, may be an explicit goal of instruction for good English stu-
dents; it would be a suitable topic for a test item or for an operational objective in 
instruction . In these steps, we observe that the tree reaches from the highest 
philosophical and social values , through only a few steps, to the lowliest and 
most concrete behavioral objective. Surprisingly, climbing down this tree , the 
educational philosopher may actually be able to converse (chatter?) with the 
educational psychologist, who may be occupied with behavior modification 
techniques . 
But how is the actual "evaluation" carried on? Having investigated two 
methods, we believe that a "token" method may be suitable for most curricular 
purposes: In this method, appropriate judges , acting individually, apportion 100 
tokens (such as poker chips) among the half-dozen divisions at each branch. The 
method may be applied recursively , at any level of the tree, and by judges chosen 
as appropriate to that level. At the top, it might be educational leaders or simply 
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FIG . 2.5. The recursive nature of the ben tee method. As analys is moves from 
the general to the spec ific, a shift is made from societal to expert opinion and from 
va lue space to test space. (Source: E. B. Page, 1974 . Reprinted with permission.) 
in formed citizens. At the lower levels, it might be subject matter specialists or 
future employers (in training situations). These trees may be adapted for any new 
program of study with its own nodes and branches. 
Such a tree has a fairly clear relation to the use of test scores in decision 
making. Where we have test scores for the various branches (such as English, 
math , social studies, natural sciences), we may apportion our tokens according to 
our beliefs in the relative benefits of these accomplishments. And our weightings 
may vary with the individual concerned (the general student may have a different 
weighting vector from the premed) or with the program under study . But once 
such judgments are established, then we may proceed to evaluate the educational 
accomplishment of individuals, of groups, and of programs. By adopting 
changes in such bentees as our objectives, we may plot our production functions 
as a relation between decision alternatives and the values that we seek to opti-
mize . Given such methods, we may employ much more frequently the well-
developed techniques of the dec ision sciences in our own studies of policy. (The 
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reader is directed to related literature: For a technical approach different from the 
bentee, see Dalkey, 1969 . For a deeper understanding of means-end analysis, see 
Churchman, 1961. For a classic treatment of personnel decisions and test scores , 
see Cronbach & Gieser , 1965; and for the most advanced general treatment of 
multiple objectives, see Keeney & Raiffa, 1976.) 
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS AND CAUSAL RESEARCH 
We have already noted that "production functions" must involve more than 
incidental relationships between variables. When we seek to "optimize" some 
benefits from our decisions, we must depend on the assumption of a causal 
relation between the decision alternatives and the desired benefit. For example, 
suppose we note, as many researchers have, a recurring agreement between child 
intelligence and family income. If we believe that this relation is causal, then we 
naturally predict that when we change fami ly income, we will correspondingly 
change child intelligence, at least to some limited degree. Programs to eliminate 
poverty, therefore, according to this reasoning, should have a strong influence on 
reducing school fai lure . 
Or if we believe that such intelligence is a causal outcome of time spent with 
the child by a well-intentioned adult , then we will predict that programs such as 
Head Start will have a clearly beneficial effect on future performance of par-
ticipating children. Many programs of recent decades have, in fact , been con-
structed on the assumption that observed correlations of this sort represented 
strong causal relations . The disappointment about such programs results from the 
ambiguous and debatable outcomes actually observed. (For a sharp disappoint-
ment in a major experiment, see Page, 1972a.) We do not need to resolve these 
issues themselves to understand the need for some improved methods of policy 
study. The most important improvement seems to be this: We must routinely 
seek out data that will permit us to estab lish causal models explaining the 
maximum amount of variance possible of those variables that we wish to opti-
mize. This means, in the first place, that we indeed have such models and , in the 
second, that we systematicall y collect the information that will maximize our 
knowledge . The first requirement implies that we must turn to path analysis to 
make explicit our causal models. Figure 2.3 shows such a model for exactly such 
a purpose, here seeking a causal influence of homework time on test achieve-
ment. The second requirement implies that we should emphasize the use of 
comprehensive data sets, rich with the correlates, whether from school, society , 
or fami ly , that most aid in causal explanation of our outcomes of interest. In Fig. 
2.3, then, we truly wish to know the effect of homework time on achievement; 
but we do not wish to be deceived by the correlates of race, SES, or other school 
variables in estab lishing our "production function ." But if we did not collect 
these background characteristics (including intelligence) or if we did not com-
32 PAGE 
bine them properly into our causal model, we would be utterly deceived about 
the effect of homework (just as Coleman, as mentioned earlier, was deceived in 
his claimed effect of private schools). 
Path Analysis. As a testing profession, then, interested in policy decisions, 
we must turn to the rich discipline that is now the center for policy research in 
most social sciences. This is the field of path analysis, introduced by Sewall 
Wright (1921) some 6 decades ago. In its wandering route, it has come from 
genetics, to economics, to sociology, to education and psychology and is now 
found at the heart of many of the research journals in these fields. The number of 
textbooks about path analysis has rapidly increased in recent years, and these 
have improved in complexity and quality (Aigner & Goldberger, 1977; Blalock, 
1971; Duncan, 1975; Heise, 1975; Kenny, 1979; Kerlinger & Pedhazur, 1973, 
ch . 11; Li, 1975; Pedhazur, 1982, chs. 15-16; Taubman, 1977). 
There is excellent research discipline in using these models. Because they are 
explicitly causal, their use forces us to specify our hypotheses about the presence 
and direction of causal influences and strongly encourages us to employ in our 
models whatever variables we have available that may illuminate our interests. 
Drawing and publishing such a model, moreover, forces us to put "up front" our 
assumptions about these influences. If we have left out measures of intelligence , 
say, or family influence, then this will be apparent in our model. Or if we have 
placed variables in the wrong order, thus distorting the influences, this too will 
be apparent to our readers, whether they are allies or critics. These considera-
tions, clearly, have huge meanings for debates about policy decisions. Indeed, 
without such considerations of background influences, it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to plot out any ratios for costs versus anticipated benefits. 
Comprehensive Data Sets. The second major requirement for such causal 
reasoning is the availability and use of large data sets containing the information 
necessary for causal inference and estimation. High School and Beyond is proba-
bly the most pertinent and available data set for many current concerns. It will be 
still more valuable as the follow-ups are completed and distributed in 1983 and 
beyond (current tapes are available through the National Center for Education 
Statistics , U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C.) . A splendid data 
set is also available in the predecessor to HSB, the National Longitudinal Study 
of 1972, with its four follow-ups (also available from the NCES in Washington). 
Still another valuable set of tapes may be obtained from the U.S. Department of 
Labor, dealing more with work and later life and less with the high school years. 
But each of these data sets lacks something of great importance in family back-
ground and many other matters that might be of large interest for many particular 
policy questions . 
Still, such data sets are much more powerful than many realize , even when 
they appear to lack certain variables of prime concern . Advanced path techniques 
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involving unmeasured variables or latent variables can often generate new fac-
tors much closer to the variables of real concern. For instance, we generated a 
relatively school-free "mental ability" from factor analyzing a set of short 
mental tests (Page & Keith, 1981) . Others have similarly constructed factors of 
"self-concept" from a collection of items about attitude. HSB already supplies 
an excellent SES scale from a weighted sum of many relevant questions about 
education, occupation, home, and other factors. In general, then , a rich data set 
can be much more than the simple sum of its parts. 
CONCLUSIONS 
From this analysis, there are some strong inferences to draw about the use of tests 
in decision making, and we briefly summarize them here: 
1. Test professionals and test users should stop being placed on the defen-
sive by ill-informed and polemical critics. We should reassert, firmly and pub-
licly , the many virtues of testing and the superiority of making decisions using 
tests, compared with those made without tests. 
2 . We should insist that psychometricians and others depending on tests be 
heard in the major media when tests are discussed. 
3. We should stop being apologetic about the reality that tests do, in part , 
show genetic influences and other family influences as well as social environ-
mental influences. These are in fact part of their purpose. 
4. We should cite frequently the research on the alleged biases of the most 
widely used standardized tests of abi lity and achievement. In general, the conclu-
sions are similar to those of the blue-ribbon National Academy of Sciences panel : 
When properly used, tests are not biased against English-speaking U.S. minority 
groups. 
5. The measurement of intelligence is one of the greatest achievements in all 
behavior science. The attempts to eliminate it from consideration at many deci-
sion points (such as selection for certain programs, schools, colleges, and profes-
sions) are not in the best interests of education nor of society as a whole. 
6. When using tests in research on achievement, we should often lean 
toward the avai lable standardized instruments, especially when these may be 
treated securely. 
7 . In such research situations, we should commonly control for the entering 
ability of the students. It is often fallacious to make program selection without 
such controls and may lead us to wasteful and disillusioning programs. 
8. To assist in making decisions, test researchers should become more fa-
miliar with methods from the decision sciences, which permit technical analysis 
of projected costs and benefits. 
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9. To make use of such decision models, test researchers should translate 
scores, where necessary, into useful values to serve as production functions. 
10. But to use such production functions, we must look closely at the under-
lying causal relations of the variables (such as achievement) that we wish to 
optimize. We should design these relations into explicitly causal models in path 
analysis. 
11. If researchers look only at the variables of narrow interest, they will often 
be deceived by what Simon called "spurious correlation." Rather, the explana-
tory variables must be expanded to control, as much as possible, for background 
correlates of both programs and outcomes. 
12. Many of such correlates will be found strongly active in family influ-
ences . To study such family influences, wherever possible researchers should 
look to twin pairs and other sibling and kinship relations, together with their 
degree of kinship (e.g., if known, whether twins are identical or fraternal). 
13. It is important that government agencies, large testing corporations, and 
other collectors of data recognize the explanatory power of such family informa-
tion and collect such variables into data sets wherever feasible. 
14. And it is, finally, important that data sets be made inexpensively avail-
able to researchers , so that the causal study of human achievement may proceed 
in as open and active and public an environment as we can create . 
Now it should be evident why this chapter is called Struggles and Pos-
sibilities. Testing is struggling under attacks by many enemies, operating from 
many motives and conceptions , often incorrect. And testing is also under con-
stant criticism from its friends. It is friendly criticism, of course, that most 
characterizes the scientific enterprise and the tradition of Oscar Buros, as editor 
and model for this Institute that we celebrate in this volume. It is this ferment of 
friendly and informed criticism that has fostered the splendid growth of our field 
in its theoretical structure and in the construction and use of tests. These too are 
struggles, and they are essential to the continuing evolution of testing. Surely, 
the Buros Institute will continue this tradition of sharp and searching criticism by 
its most knowledgeable friends. 
We must call upon ourselves, as well, to defend our field firmly against the 
defamations and uninformed assaults by its enemies. If we are faithful to the 
scientific tradition of open scientific debate and self-criticism, then testing will 
continue to grow and flourish, just as it has during the Buros' shared lifetime of 
work. But let us , and the Institute, firmly and courageously take sides. 
Our field, after all, is probably the soundest structurally of any in the social 
and behavioral sciences . It is probably the most useful for decision making, for 
individuals and for social programs. For its past accomplishments, it probably 
has the smallest amount of apology to make- though it will surely be trans-
formed in each succeeding generation as more is learned. Let us celebrate the 
field as we celebrate the Buros Institute. Perhaps the Institute might prominently 
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display on its wall those famous lines from Shakespeare, now as applicable to 
our discipline as to ourselves as individuals: 
This above all: To thine own self be true, 
And it must follow , as the night the day , 
Thou canst not then be false to any man. 
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